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Abstract: Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive
evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that
philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneuxs arguments are that: (1) the
propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and
kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited;
(2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as
evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are
treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial
defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.
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1. Introduction
Consider three different articles I might have written in place of this
one. Suppose that all three articles present plausible cases for their
stated conclusions.
1. An article arguing that philosophers dont rely on telescopes.
2. An article arguing that philosophers dont use arguments—in which
“use arguments” is used as shorthand for “use heated debate as a
way to exhaust ones critics long enough to bash them over the
head.”
3. An article arguing that philosophers dont use arguments—in
which “use arguments” is used in a more conventional way.
Id hope that only the last of these would stand any chance of getting
through the review process. The first paper simply isnt of any philo-
sophical interest. It might stimulate curiosity as to why on earth anyone
would ever feel the need to publicly make the case that philosophers
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didnt use telescopes, but thats about it in terms of interest. The second
paper, again, isnt really of any interest. The slight difference is that this
time the language of the paper might suggest the paper was more inter-
esting than it actually is. Who would deny that philosophers use argu-
ments? Everyone accepts that! If there were good reasons to think
everyone was mistaken, it would be important for any paper articulating
those reasons to be given a good airing! The third paper is different. It
would be important for any paper articulating good reasons to think
philosophers dont use arguments to be given a good airing.
A number of books and papers have recently argued against descrip-
tive evidentialism about intuitions in philosophy (e.g., Cappelen 2012,
2014; Deutsch 2010, 2015; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009; Ichikawa
2014). Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intu-
itions as evidence. We can call those who argue against descriptive evi-
dentialism “intuition deniers” (following Nado 2015). Debates about
intuitions in philosophy are difficult for many reasons. One of them is
that many different ways of thinking about intuitions are available to
us.1 Another is that, independent of the fact that there are many ways
of thinking about intuitions available, there are many ways of under-
standing the claim that philosophers use intuitions. This means that
those arguing against descriptive evidentialism run the risk of appear-
ing—at least to those who argue for or unreflectively accept descriptive
evidentialism—to offer a paper rather like the one I might have written
that only looks as if it argues that philosophers dont use arguments
(due to an eccentric reading of “arguments”).2 For example, when the
intuition denier Cappelen (2012) understands descriptive evidentialism
as making a claim about some method that is distinctive to philosophy,
those of us who dont share the sense that descriptive evidentialism is
naturally interpreted as making such a claim can be left feeling that
Cappelens arguments somehow miss their target.3
Given this background, it is worth paying close attention to
intuition-denying arguments that take as their target a fairly straight-
forward reading of the claim that philosophers use intuitions as evi-
dence. Bernard Molyneuxs recent arguments in “New Arguments That
Philosophers Dont Treat Intuitions as Evidence” (2014) are, by this
token, worth considering closely. Molyneuxs strategy is to consider a
number of examples in which intuitions undeniably play a role in phi-
losophy, and in fairly typical ways, but where there is some problem
with interpreting those uses as uses as evidence.
Molyneux raises three main considerations:
1 This also distracts the debate in other ways, which I discuss in Andow 2015c.
2 I make a similar point in Andow 2016.
3 And there are independent reasons for doubting that philosophers use intuitions in a
distinctive way (Andow a, b).
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Insufficiency. The propositions that intuition putatively supports
are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justifica-
tion that they could not have got from being intuited.
Liberal applicability. Intuitions influence us in ways we cannot
explain by supposing we treat them as evidence.
Anomalous inadmissibility. Certain strong intuitions that persuade
us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of
justification.
These considerations are important. If Molyneux is right, then the
pressure against the view that philosophers use intuitions as evidence is
greater than ever.
In this article, I aim to make some trouble for Molyneuxs argu-
ments. This is done in a constructive spirit. I am not unsympathetic to
the idea that the sorts of considerations Molyneux raises put pressure
on descriptive evidentialism. Nonetheless, I will argue as follows: (a)
Molyneuxs case for insufficiency and liberal applicability doesnt work
as it is; and (b), concerning anomalous inadmissibility, the cases of inad-
missibility Molyneux identifies are not anomalous because they are per-
fectly explicable by the proponent of descriptive evidentialism about
intuitions.
2. Insufficiency
This is Molyneuxs claim: The propositions that intuition putatively
supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justi-
fication that they could not have got from being intuited.
The main point Molyneux raises in favour of this claim is that, in
cases where p putatively enjoys evidential support from intuitions, the
justification for p is not undermined by attacks on the claim that p is
intuitive. This point is intended as a sociological one: as a matter of
fact, when philosophers encounter evidence that a claim they take to
enjoy intuitive evidential support is not intuitive, their attitude to the
claim itself doesnt change, for example, by reducing credence.4
I suspect that this sociological claim is false. Molyneux uses a single
example to make his case: the supposedly intuitive proposition that p is
possible only if not-p is not necessary. This particular example is an
atypical example of a proposition that philosophers take to enjoy
4 We could understand the claim as an epistemic one: the fact that p is not intuitive
doesnt undermine the epistemic standing of p (where p is something philosophers typi-
cally take to enjoy evidential support from intuition). Such a claim, however, wouldnt
help establish Molyneuxs claim, insufficiency, or put pressure on any claims about what
philosophers actually do.
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intuitive support. More typical examples of propositions that enjoy
intuitive support are particular claims with no modal content, for
example, about cases, artworks, trolley problems, sentences, and so on.
In order to put pressure on the idea that the typical use of intuitions in
philosophy is as evidence, we will also need to consider more typical
cases. In particular, we need to ask the following. Is it the case that,
with respect to more typical cases, evidence that claims philosophers
take to enjoy intuitive evidential support are not intuitive doesnt
reduce philosophers credence in the claims themselves? It is clear that
there is some work to do here. There are countless cases in the litera-
ture that seem to involve philosophers trying to accommodate proposi-
tions that they come to believe are intuitive or reducing the weight they
give to propositions that turn out not to be intuitive, and countless
anecdotes about philosophers conducting casual surveys of their classes
and audiences to check that the claims that they are relying on are
intuitive. So, absent empirical findings to the contrary, Im inclined to
think the defender of Molyneuxs strategy has some work to do where
these more typical cases are involved.
Moreover, I even remain unconvinced about Molyneuxs more atypi-
cal example. I dont deny that general and modal claims are typically
taken to enjoy intuitive support by philosophers. But it is worth think-
ing about the two ways this happens. Molyneux discusses what we
might call direct intuitional support. A general and modal claim is sup-
ported by the intuition with that content. It is often the case, however,
that some, most, or all support for such claims comes more indirectly.
The intuitive support one has for accepting modal and general claims
often comes via intuitions about numerous actual and counterfactual
cases or via having intuitions about numerous particular claims (which
may have no obvious modal content).
Molyneux asks whether philosophers would be inclined to change
their attitude to the proposition p is possible only if not-p is not neces-
sary when confronted with evidence that the supposed intuitive support
isnt in fact intuitive. He might be right about the case in which philos-
ophers are confronted with evidence that that very proposition is not
intuitive. But ask yourself whether philosophers would be inclined to
change their attitude to the very same proposition if confronted with
evidence that, for lots of particular claims p1–pn, most people find it
incredibly intuitive both that pi is possible and that not-pi is necessary.
Now, I dont for a moment think that most people have such intu-
itions, but that is beside the point for my argument. Ask yourself the
following question: What do you think philosophers would do were
they to become genuinely convinced that such contents—that many
particular propositions are both possible and their negations neces-
sary—are genuinely intuitive? I think it is far from clear that philoso-
phers attitudes to the claim that p is possible only if not-p is not
JAMES ANDOW186
VC 2017 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
necessary wouldnt change. So, I dont think that the sociological claim
Molyneux requires should be granted even if restricted to his atypical
case.
Maybe I have been unfair. When Molyneux considers attacks on the
claim that p is intuitive, he considers a rather different kind of attack
from that which I have been considering. He considers attacks like the
following: “For example, the classical Platonist might argue that we
dont intuit [p]; rather, we recall it. And the contemporary nativist, sim-
ilarly, may suppose that [p] is not intuited but abstracted from our
native beliefs. An empiricist might argue that [p], rather than being
intuited, is extracted from lessons learned via past experience, in which
it was implicit. And the attitude eliminativist, meanwhile, might even
claim that there are no such mental states as intuitions” (2014, 447).
That is, Molyneux considers attacks on the idea that the relevant prop-
ositional mental state counts as an intuition or that the process via which
it was acquired genuinely counts as intuitive. Now, I agree that most phi-
losophers dont downgrade their credence in propositions they take to
enjoy intuitive support in light of such arguments and positions. How-
ever, I think the reason most philosophers remain unmoved (by such
arguments and positions in their credence in propositions they take to
enjoy intuitive support) is that they remain unconvinced that the claims
and arguments of the Platonist, nativist, empiricist, and eliminativist have
got anything going for them. And, if we instead consider the case in
which philosophers genuinely become convinced that one of these alter-
native stories is correct (and convinced that the alternative story suggests
no alternative source of support to the support they took the relevant
proposition to have in virtue of its being genuinely intuitive), again I
think it is far from clear that philosophers attitudes wouldnt change.
I wouldnt want my aim in the previous few paragraphs to be misun-
derstood. Ultimately, I am not sure what real methodological progress
can be made by speculating about what philosophers would do in coun-
terfactual cases such as those in which philosophers come to genuinely
accept particular positions and arguments. Rather, the lesson that I
draw from the above discussion is that Molyneuxs strategy—arguing
that philosophers dont downgrade their credence in propositions they
take to enjoy evidential support in the face of evidence that those claims
are not intuitive—would do well to pay attention to more typical, every-
day cases of propositions that are taken to enjoy intuitive support.
3. Liberal Applicability
This is Molyneuxs claim: Intuitions influence us in ways we cannot
explain by supposing we treat them as evidence.
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What are these influences? Molyneux thinks that (1) intuition influ-
ences inference. He considers the sociological fact that (2) philosophers
are happy to appeal to intuitions in areas of philosophy where noncog-
nitivism is a live option.
I want to set aside the first. Why? Because, although it is natural to
think of intuition guiding inference, for example intuition leads us to
infer q from p and if p then q, such an influence poses no threat to the
general picture assumed by the descriptive evidentialist. Remember,
Molyneuxs target is a claim about how philosophers use intuitions.
Note, in particular, the following aspect of Molyneuxs understanding
of the descriptive evidentialists claim: “The claim, then, does not
quantify over intuitions, nor even instances where intuitions are used.
It quantifies over instances where intuitions are used in the way that
has become standard in philosophy. It tells us that such cases should
be understood as appeals to evidence. It is that claim that I mean to
oppose” (2014, 444).
The reason I set aside the idea that intuition influences inference is
that such cases are not instances where “intuitions are used in the way
that has become standard in philosophy” in virtue of the fact that they
are not uses of intuition at all. Using something is rather different from
being influenced by it. For instance, take the role that the books on my
shelves play in my philosophizing. I do use them. But they affect my
philosophizing in many ways that do not involve my using them. My
books comfort me. They make me happy. They disguise the despair-
provoking stark white walls. They even lend a pleasant fragrance to the
air. Without those books surrounding me, I might well have rather dif-
ferent thoughts. But this influence is not a way I am using the books.
Molyneuxs point about noncognitivism cant be set aside in this
way. Noncognitivism is a live option in many domains. Cognitivists
and noncognitivists have different interpretations of what is going on
when people think and talk about things in the relevant domains. For
example, in ethics, while the cognitivist says moral attitudes have prop-
ositional contents, such as “murder is wrong,” which can be true or
false, the noncognitivist says moral attitudes are nonpropositional and
so not truth apt. This creates a problem because many accept that only
propositional contents can enjoy evidential support. So, if noncogniti-
vism is true of a domain, then descriptive evidentialism about philo-
sophical enquiry in that domain is false.
It is tempting to think that philosophical methodology (of relevant
subfields) is simply another domain where cognitivists and noncogniti-
vists should give competing interpretations. Take Molyneuxs example:
“Suppose I wanted to get you to agree to a proscription against killing,
even to save others. Then I could pump an intuition to forbid harvest-
ing a healthy persons organs for transplantation, and invite you to
generalize” (2014, 453–54).
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What is going on when I appeal to an intuition in this way? Perhaps
the cognitivist will want to say that what is going on is that I am using
an intuition as evidence. Whereas noncognitivists will have to say some-
thing else is going on (although, as Molyneux notes, they cant very
well deny that whatever is going on involves an appeal to an intuition).
But this leaves descriptive evidentialists in a bit of a bind, according to
Molyneux. They are committed to noncognitivism about any domain
in which they think their account applies, and yet their claim is meant
to be a general one about philosophical methods. Molyneux thinks that
it is unsatisfactory for the descriptive evidentialist to simply own a
commitment to cognitivism: “The evidentialist could simply deny non-
cognitivism. That would be an unfortunate retreat, however, since the
right philosophical methodology ought to be compatible with all the
open positions. The philosophical method alone should no more tell us
which positions are wrong than the judicial procedure alone should tell
us which defendants are guilty” (2014, 452).
Theres an interesting metamethodological principle that seems to
play a role in the argument Molyneux is advancing here. This principle
is that the final account of philosophical methods should have no
implications for which first-order philosophical positions are correct.
There are a few ways of interpreting such a principle. Im not sure any
of them help Molyneuxs argument. But lets look at some of the
options.
First, the relevant metamethodological principle might be one gov-
erning either descriptive or normative methodology. The claim might
be that no adequate account of what philosophers actually do says that
philosophers follow a method that has implications in first-order phi-
losophy. On the other hand, the claim might be that no adequate
account of what philosophers should do says they follow such a method.
Some of Molyneuxs choice of words might be taken to suggest the lat-
ter. Since descriptive evidentialism is a descriptive thesis, however, the
metamethodological principle Molyneux needs to appeal to is some-
thing more like the former.
Second, the relevant metamethodological principle might be one
about philosophical methods in the sense of something like a set of
rules or procedures that enquirers conceive of themselves as following. On
the other hand, the principle might be about philosophical methods in
the sense of a theoretical description of what enquirers are doing that
enquirers themselves might outright reject. What Molyneuxs argument
requires is a principle of the latter variety. Descriptive evidentialists
and intuition deniers are in the business of getting beyond philoso-
phers conceptions of their practice and asking whether philosophers
practices actually involve the use of intuitions as evidence. To see this,
consider the fact that many philosophers think that they do use
DEFENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENTIALISM ABOUT INTUITIONS 189
VC 2017 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
intuitions as evidence provides at best weak and indirect evidence
against the views of intuition deniers.
There is something attractive sounding about the type of principle
Molyneux advances. I agree, for instance, that there would be some-
thing troubling about the situation in which metaethicists sit down and
try to work out the best account of moral discourse, and deliberately
and knowingly employ a method that they explicitly conceive of in
terms that are obviously and straightforwardly incompatible with non-
cognitivist views. On the other hand, I am not at all troubled if the
final account in descriptive methodology ends up diagnosing that what
was going on all the time—at a deeper level—was that cognitivists and
noncognitivists alike were using intuitions as evidence. It seems per-
fectly appropriate for the correct account in descriptive methodology to
be hostage to truths about the real nature of the discourse in the field
whose methods it aims to describe. For example, it would be very
strange if the final and accurate description of philosophical methods
ended up being neutral on all issues in epistemology, philosophy of
action, philosophy of mind, and so on. Thus, I am not persuaded by
the aspect of Molyneuxs argument that rests on this kind of metame-
thodological principle.
There are, however, other aspects of the problem that Molyneux
thinks the issue of noncognitivism raises for the descriptive evidential-
ist. He says the argument “is that the use of intuitions in an area of
inquiry is insensitive to whether noncognitivism is endorsed and that
this cannot be explained on an evidentialist proposal. To provide an
emotivist illustration, suppose that I wanted to persuade you not to
boo the termination of a pregnancy. Then I might ask if you find it
intuitive to boo a person disconnecting herself from a sick violinist. If
you say no, I only need to invite you to boo things consistently” (2014,
453). He then adds, “To argue that [such] strategies are attempts to use
intuitions as evidence for expressions of emotion . . . one has to commit
a category error, since [that is not a kind of thing] that can be sup-
ported by evidence. But nor do [such] examples seem to differ radically
from how we deploy intuitions quite generally” (2014, 454).
Molyneux is right about the following: If X says that Y is trying to
use intuitions as evidence for expressions of emotion, X is making a
category error. But no descriptive evidentialists who accept a commit-
ment to cognitivism would make such a claim. Rather, their claim
would be that the emotivists are doing exactly the same thing that any-
one else is doing—using intuitions as evidence for propositions—the
only difference being that the emotivists are mistaken about the nature
of their practice and their claims. The methodologist who is in trouble
is the one who accepts noncognitivism in a domain but maintains that
the role of intuitions in the relevant domain is nonetheless evidential.
Noncognitivists who unreflectively think their method involves the use
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of intuitions as evidence are making a similar mistake. But it is impor-
tant to note what their mistake is not. Their mistake is not the follow-
ing: to use intuitions while endorsing noncognitivism. After all, in the
same way that the noncognitivist about ethical discourse can reinterpret
what is going on when it might seem people have beliefs about whether
particular acts are moral, noncognitivists can employ a reinterpretation
of what is going on when it might seem their method involves the use
of intuitions as evidence. For example, noncognitivists could naturally
understand their method in terms of intuitions (understood as nonpro-
positional attitudes) and some non-truth-involving sense of support
broader than evidence.
What I think is right about Molyneuxs point here is that descriptive
evidentialists as a rule need to say more about the areas of philosophy
where noncognitivism is a live option. Do they accept their cognitivist
commitments? Do they recognise such commitments as a burden?
However, I dont think this issue provides a compelling argument—that
is independent of arguments for and against noncognitivism—against
descriptive evidentialism.
4. Anomalous Inadmissibility
This is Molyneuxs claim: Certain strong intuitions that persuade us of
their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification.
There is a difference between, on the one hand, that which per-
suades us or that which constitutes our justification and, on the other
hand, that which we adduce to persuade others or that which we judge
to be suitable for such a use. Moreover, the facts we find on one side
of the distinction may very well not appear on the other side. Why?
Because we judge other people to have different dispositions to us. Sup-
pose I am arguing with a rampant capitalist and ask myself the follow-
ing question: What evidence should I use to persuade this rampant
capitalist to cut his carbon emissions? In this case, it wouldnt make
sense for me to assume that the first place to look is my own reasons
for thinking it is a good idea for him to cut his carbon emissions, or
what I regard to be the most important evidence for that position. This
is to say, features of the dialectical situation can rule out making cer-
tain types of appeal in the context of justification.
The dialectics of some philosophical debates and discussion are
weirder than others. In many philosophical debates, the relevant oppo-
nent or interlocutor is imaginary. We often attempt to question and
defend positions that no one previously ever thought to deny. The
weird thing is that, in this kind of debate, one still has to be charitable
to ones opponent. Despite the fact that they dont exist, there are rules
about what intuitions you are allowed to suppose she has. You are not
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allowed to suppose that everything which is completely obvious to you
is also completely obvious to your opponent. With real opponents, you
have to find some common ground in order to avoid begging the ques-
tion when you give your argument. With imaginary opponents, you
have to do something similar.
In weird dialectics with imaginary interlocutors, the rules are some-
times unclear. Take certain infamous debates about scepticism. Heres
an argument the sceptic might give:
1. I dont know Im not being deceived by an Evil Demon.
2. If I dont know that, then I dont know that I have hands.
3. So, I dont know that I have hands.
And heres an argument the antisceptic might give:
1. I know that I have hands.
2. If I know that, then I know Im not being deceived by an Evil
Demon.
3. So, I know Im not being deceived by an Evil Demon.
Is it legitimate to use the second argument to argue against the sceptic?
It is easy to get oneself into a mind-set from which it seems that such
an argument is not legitimate. There is something pretty unsatisfactory
about attempting to refute scepticism by simply weighing the relative
intuitiveness of I know that I have hands and I dont know that I am not
being deceived. One way to articulate the unease one might feel about
such an argumentative move is to say that it is uncharitable to assume
that the sceptic would share your relative weighting of the intuitiveness
of those propositions. If you are going to seriously attempt to refute
the sceptic, is the thought, this isnt the common ground from which to
fight. But this isnt the only mind-set available. It is also fairly easy to
get oneself into a mind-set from which the Moorean-shift type of move
feels perfectly legitimate. In particular, it can feel like the second argu-
ment provides perfectly legitimate grounds on which to justify failing
to engage the sceptic in any further debate. An opponent who isnt
even willing to accept such a basic common ground isnt worth engag-
ing, might be the thought.
For the purposes of my argument, I dont need to arbitrate between
these two stances or mind-sets. I dont have any firm opinion about
which is the more defensible. Regardless of which mind-set is ultimately
the more defensible, this discussion already helps provide a response to
Molyneuxs argument that the fact that certain strong intuitions are
treated as being inadmissible in the context of justification gives us rea-
son to doubt that the standard philosophical use of intuitions is as
evidence.
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Consider that, while Molyneux doesnt consider the external world
sceptic, his examples do all concern sceptics of one stripe or another,
for example:
1. The problem of induction and the inadmissibility of the intuitive-
ness of the claim that induction is an epistemically virtuous prin-
ciple of reasoning and the counterintuitiveness of the claim that
counterinduction is not in debates about the epistemic virtue of
induction.
2. Kripkenstein and the inadmissibility of the intuitiveness of plus-
answers and the counterintuitiveness of quus-answers in debates
about the meaning of “plus” and thus debates about meaning.
3. Indeterminacy of translation and the inadmissibility of the intui-
tiveness of interpreting “gavagai” as referring to rabbits rather
than undetached rabbit parts.
And Molyneuxs observation about such debates is that “philosophers
do not dismiss these problems so glibly. Why not? If intuitions were
standardly used as evidence, then our strong intuitions should have set-
tled these matters long ago. The glib response, in each case, should
have been perfectly permissible” (2014, 456).
Now we are in a position to see why not—why philosophers do not
dismiss these problems so glibly. In each case, the interlocutor is imagi-
nary. No one thinks counterinduction is the epistemically virtuous prin-
ciple. No one defends understanding “plus” as quus, “gavagai” as
undetached rabbit parts, or inducing from the fact that all observed
emeralds have been grue (to use Molyneuxs fourth and final example).
According to a certain mind-set, however, certain dialectical rules apply
despite the fact that our interlocutor is imaginary. According to such a
mind-set, for example, if you are going to argue against the various
forms of scepticism involved, and to take them seriously, then you can-
not make certain assumptions about the common ground. Imagine that
I had before me a genuine believer in the idea that plus means quus. It
does seem off for us to imagine this individual replete with plus-
favouring intuitions. The weirdness of the dialectical situation means
that even these basic very strong intuitions are off limits and cannot be
deployed in the context of justification. Note that this is completely
compatible with thinking that the relevant intuitions do provide very
strong evidence, it is just inadmissible given certain assumptions about
the way that debates with imaginary sceptics should be conducted.
As with the Moorean-shift example, it is true that there is another
mind-set available. According to this alternative mindset the glib
response is perfectly appropriate, and there is no obligation to engage
with an imaginary sceptic who refuses to admit the greater intuitiveness
of the commonsense premise. If all philosophers had such a mind-
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set all of the time, then the fact that strong intuitions havent settled
the arguments about all these varieties of scepticism would be a real
mystery for the descriptive evidentialist to explain. But so long as suffi-
ciently many philosophers find themselves in a mind-set according to
which it is dialectically unacceptable to respond to sceptics in such
ways sufficiently often, then there is no great mystery here for the
descriptive evidentialist to explain.
Maybe there are cases in which intuitions are inexplicably treated as
being inadmissible. However, these need to be cases in which it is not
plausible to say that both (1) philosophers do use X intuitions as evi-
dence and (2) dialectical considerations mean that it wouldnt make
sense to adduce X intuitions as evidence.5
5. Conclusion
I have attempted a partial defence of the claim that the standard use of
intuitions in philosophy is as evidence. I have defended this claim
against recent arguments by Molyneux that provide, I think, some of
the strongest intuition-denying arguments which have been produced to
date. It would be a problem for the proponent of the idea that the
standard use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence if examination
of actual philosophical practice showed that philosophers attitudes to
the propositions that putatively enjoy intuitive support were typically
unchanging in the face of arguments that attack the intuitiveness of
those propositions. More work needs to be done, however, to demon-
strate that philosophers attitudes are unresponsive in this way. It
would also be a problem for the proponent of the idea that the stan-
dard use of intuitions in philosophy is as evidence if examination of
philosophical practice showed that typical uses of intuition by philoso-
phers simply do not square with the idea that they were being used as
evidence. Neither of Molyneuxs examples is yet a convincing instance
of this, however. Finally, it would also be a problem for the descriptive
evidentialist if examination of philosophical practice revealed many
cases of strong intuitions inexplicably being treated as being inadmissi-
ble in a context of justification. Yet all of Molyneuxs cases of inadmis-
sibility can be accounted for by the idea that, despite treating the
relevant intuitions as evidence, dialectical considerations mean that the
5 Note that the same point I am making here might be made with respect to many
debates and types of evidence. For similar dialectical reasons, there are certain proposi-
tions that you will not find used by brave folks who seriously and wisely engage with con-
spiracy theorists, flat-earthers, and the like, despite the fact that those propositions are
taken to provide very good evidence (and used as evidence in other contexts) by the brave
folks concerned.
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intuitions cant be used as evidence or adduced in the relevant
contexts.6
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